The Eurovision Song Contest and the European Union

The 70th edition of the Eurovision Song Contest (side note: For those unfamiliar with the Eurovision Song Contest, I once again refer to John Oliver’s segment on Last Week Tonight about the shitshow that was the 2024 edition.) (ESC) will be held in Vienna this week. Like clockwork, the same questions keep popping up on social media every year.

“Why was Russia booted from the contest for invading Ukraine but Israel gets a free pass despite repeatedly invading its neighbours?” Virtually everyone agrees that Russia is the aggressor in the Russo-Ukrainian war, whereas Israel’s repeated incursions against its neighbours remain a very touchy subject for a few participating countries.

“What is Israel doing in the contest anyway, Israel isn’t even in Europe?” They’re a member of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which covers a lot more than just the European continent.

“What is Australia doing in the contest, Australia isn’t even close to Europe?” Apparently Australians love Eurovision so much that the EBU made an exception for them. Also, Australia is a partner of the EBU.

“Why doesn’t Europe ever give points to the United Kingdom, does it hate the UK because of Brexit?” It’s actually because the United Kingdom has been sending mediocre acts for years and years (side note: Case in point: the former frontman of Years & Years).

“Why is Eurovision so gay?” I honestly don’t know, nor do I care… Why should anyone?

Underlying many of these questions is an implicit assumption that the Eurovision Song Contest is European in the same way that the European Union is European. This is not actually the case (side note: In fact, EU flags were banned in the 2024 edition.): the Eurovision Song Contest is a competition among EBU’s members, which often happen to be public broadcasters from countries that are part of the European Union.

But as this week’s paper shows, the general public doesn’t really care much for that distinction.

The Eurovision Song Contest is an international mega-event with very high viewership (side note: In 2016, the Eurovision Song Contest was viewed by as many as 204 million people worldwide, while in 2018 it attracted more viewers than the UEFA Champions League final that year.). This makes the contest an ideal platform for countries to engage in public diplomacy, which refers to the ability to win the hearts and minds of people around the world via soft power. For example, San Marino participates in the hope that more people know it exists, while Israel is accused of using the contest to improve its image at home and abroad.

Despite not being institutionally involved with the ESC, the contest nonetheless serves as an unintended public diplomacy opportunity for the European Union: the event is European, has representation from almost all countries in Europe at some point, and reflects the cultural notion of a united Europe. Given how embedded “Europe” is in the ESC, it is likely that exposure to the ESC influences external views of the EU.

The authors of this week’s paper are from Israel, a country that has a somewhat mixed external view of the EU. Israelis view Europe as their cultural and economic neighbourhood, despite being geographically part of Asia. At the same time, Europe is also seen as an antisemitic region where Jews can never be safe.

When Israel won ESC 2018, it got to host the contest in 2019. The authors took advantage of this by exploring whether exposure to the ESC caused changes in the Israeli public’s perceptions of the EU. This was done via a longitudinal public opinion survey conducted at two key moments: six months before ESC 2019 and immediately after the ESC 2019 final.

Overall, 61% of participants reported watching the ESC 2018 final in which Israel won the competition. There were no significant differences in sympathy for the EU between those who watched the event and those who didn’t, although interestingly more women watched the event than men and those with higher knowledge about the EU were less likely to watch the final (side note: 🤷‍♂️?).

Exposure to ESC 2019 was also high, as 60% of participants reported watching the 2019 final. This time, there were no significant gender differences between those who watched and those who didn’t. However, those who watched the final were found to be older, less religious, more affluent, more affiliated with the left, and more sympathetic with the EU.

When analysing the findings for differences in sympathy for the EU over time, the authors found no significant differences before and after ESC 2019. However, among those who watched the final, there was a significant increase in sympathy for the EU. This could suggest that external audiences indeed do not perceive the difference between Europe and the EU.